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Abstract 
Purpose – The paper reports the results of a study carried out to determine the effect of 
governing boards on the performance of Ugandan secondary schools. Specifically, the study 
investigated whether governing boards (board role performance, finance committee role 
performance, board size, frequency of board meetings and board finance expertise) have an 
effect on the perceived performance of the schools.  
 
Design/methodology/approach –This study is cross-sectional and correlational. Data was 
collected through a questionnaire survey of 271 schools out of which 200 responded. The data 
was analysed through Ordinary Least Squares regression using Statistical Package for Social 
Scientists (SPSS). 
 
Findings – The results suggest that board role performance, finance committee role 
performance, frequency of meetings and finance expertise of governing boards have a significant 
effect on the schools’ performance.  
 
Originality/value – This study shows that one way to capture the influence of all governing 
boards’ roles including service role is to adopt a perception-based approach which asks 
respondents to what extent they think governing boards fulfill all their roles. Unlike previous 
studies which used proxies for board role performance such as proportion of non-executive 
directors and board size for monitoring and control and resource provision, our study 
incorporates proxies as well as perception based measures of board role performance to 
determine if governing boards have a significant influence on the performance of Ugandan 
secondary schools. 
 
Result limitations/implications – We measure some of our variables qualitatively and 
perceptively contrary to, for instance, the commonly used quantitative measures of performance, 
but process factors which are inherently qualitative in nature can better explain variances in 
secondary schools’ performance.  Thus, in this study, we do not claim highly refined 
measurement concepts. More research is therefore needed to better refine qualitative concepts 
used in this study. Our results too suggest that board and finance committee role performance 
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and finance expertise of the board are more important for performance of a school than board 
size, and frequency of meetings which academics have been focusing on. These findings call for 
more research to validate the posited relationships. 
 
Practical implications – The results are important for governing board policy development; for 
example, in terms of prescribing the qualifications for schools’ governing board members and 
finance committee board members.  
Type of paper: Research paper 
Key Words: Secondary schools, Education, Boards, Performance, Public sector, Uganda. 
 
1. Introduction 
The importance of corporate boards as the ultimate control mechanism for managerial actions in 
the private sector has been emphasised for many years (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 
1993; Kings Report, 2002). According to Larcker et al. (2007), it is now inconceivable to think 
of situations where corporate boards are irrelevant for understanding organisational outcomes. 
Corporate boards are viewed as having the responsibility for monitoring managerial 
performance, and thus their structures and workings have received increasing attention in the 
literature. For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that board structure reveals 
information about the quality of management as well as the extent of checks and balances on 
managerial decisions.  
Consistent with the above, the relationship between board structures and organisational 
performance has been examined extensively in the literature. For example, Dahya et al. (2008), 
document a negative association between board size and performance, suggesting that firms with 
larger boards perform worse than firms with smaller boards. In this respect, the literature 
suggests that although large boards enhance the experience and knowledge base available to the 
firm, they are less flexible and more inefficient (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). 
Empirically, the relationship between performance and non-executive directors is not well 
established. Some studies found a negative relationship (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Coles, 
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Daniel and Naveen, 2008; Yermack, 1996), others (e.g. Ho and Williams, 2003; Klein, 1998; 
Ramdani and van Witteloostuijn, 2010) found a positive relation, and yet some found no relation 
(e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Weir, Laing and McKnight, 2002). 
Despite a number of studies relating to the private sector, there has been relatively very 
little empirical evidence on the relationship between governance and performance in the public 
sector (e.g.,McDonagh, 2006; Tusiime, Nkundabanyanga and Nkote, 2011). The relationship 
between governing boards and performance can differ between the private sector and public 
sector because in the analysis of for-profit organisations, it is generally assumed that managers 
choose actions that maximise the present value of their profits (Eldenburg, Hermalin, 
Weisbach and Wosinska, 2004; Kezar, 2006). The purpose of corporate governance in such 
situations is to manage the process of maximising this objective function through incentives and 
monitoring of the top management. However, in public service organisations such as secondary 
schools, it is not apparent what the managers (head teachers) are supposed to maximise. As a 
result, it is not at all clear whether corporate governance mechanisms; especially those meant for 
the private sector are equally effective in influencing performance in the public sector. 
Another feature of extant private sector based research on the influence of governing 
boards on performance is the use of proxy such as proportion of non-executive directors for 
board roles like monitoring (Fama, 1980; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), control role (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Monks & Minow, 2002) and board size for such roles as 
resource provision (e.g., Davis & Cobb, 2009). While this approach has enhanced our 
understanding of the relationship between governing boards and performance, it may be argued 
that using such proxies misses other important governing board roles such as service role in 
corporate strategy development (Judge & Zeithamal, 1992; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995). One 
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way to capture the influence of all governing boards’ roles including service role is to adopt a 
perception-based approach which asks respondents to what extent they think the governing 
boards fulfil all their roles. 
The purpose of the current study is to contribute to empirical literature on the influence of 
governing boards’ role performance in a public sector context. Specifically, we investigate 
whether board role performance, finance committee role performance, board size, frequency of 
board meetings and finance expertise have an effect on the performance of Ugandan secondary 
schools. Our study is different from previous studies and contributes to existing literature in two 
ways. First, our study is the first to investigate the relationship between governing boards and 
performance in secondary schools in Africa in general and specifically in Uganda. Uganda is 
unique because the government of Uganda has recently liberalised the education sector to allow 
private individuals to provide education services. The Education Act 2008, for example, puts the 
governing boards at the centre stage. Given that the provision of strategic direction of the school 
has been identified as one of the school board’s responsibilities (e.g., Kaufman and Herman, 
1991; Axelrod, 1994; Korac-Kakabadse et al., 2001; Jackson et al., 2003; McCormick et al., 
2006), how secondary school boards influence school performance  should be of interest to their 
stakeholders in Uganda.  
Second, unlike previous studies which used proxies for board role performance such as 
proportion of non-executive directors and board size for monitoring and control and, resource 
provision, our study incorporates proxies as well as perception-based measure of board-role 
performance to determine if governing boards have a significant influence on the performance of 
Ugandan secondary schools. As indicated above, our argument is that some board roles such as 
service roles do not have readily quantifiable proxies. We also incorporate a perception based 
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measure of finance committee role-performance following the same reasoning.  In addition, we 
also include a perception-based measure of performance which captures a number of 
performance measures by which secondary schools can be judged. This contrasts with existing 
private sector based studies that in most cases are limited to single based measures such as 
profitability (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ramdani and van Witteloostuijn, 2010). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we review literature and develop 
hypotheses. This is followed by discussion of research methodology in Section 3. In Section 4, 
we present and discuss our results. The final section is a summary and conclusion. 
 
2.  Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Board role performance 
 Generally, governing boards are common elements of many organisational structures 
(McCormick et al., 2006) including secondary Schools.  For this reason some writers have 
identified a growing interest in governing boards and some have argued that there is evidence 
that effective governance contributes to strategic direction and firm performance (Kroll et al., 
1997; Okpara, 2011). Among the roles the boards are expected to perform are:  monitoring; 
service; strategy and resource provision (Daily et al., 2003; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). According 
to Zahra and Pearce (1989), monitoring is a very crucial board role as boards of directors are 
‘‘the apex of the internal control system’’ (Jensen, 1993, p. 862). The service role pertains to 
giving school management advice and support. The governing board is also responsible for the 
strategic direction of the school (McCormick et al., 2006). The board’s role in strategy ranges 
from articulation of strategy (mission) to review of strategy implementation (Stiles and Taylor, 
2000). The resource provision role refers to the ability of a governing board to bring resources to 
the organisation. These benefits include providing legitimacy (Selznick, 1949); providing 
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experience (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990) and linking the firm to important stakeholders or 
other important parties (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Nkundabanyanga and Ahiauzu (2012), 
found that the potential of the services sector can be harnessed through board role performance. 
And for small enterprises, it has been found and argued that by performing their roles, boards can 
help overcome the internal lack of resources and complement the management with experience, 
knowledge and skills, and external influences (e.g. Castaldi and Wortman, 1984; Gabrielsson and 
Huse, 2005). Olson (2000) investigated governance and financial performance in nonprofit 
colleges and concluded that decision control facilitated by tenure and expertise had a positive 
influence on the organisation’s financial performance. Herman, Renz and Heimovics (1997) also 
found that boards that have specific processes for evaluating CEO performance were more likely 
to be found in effective organisations. Moreover, as Herman and Renz (2000) note, effective 
boards improve organisational performance. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H1:  Board-role performance has influence on the performance of Ugandan secondary schools 
  
2.2 Finance committee role performance 
 While the role of finance sub-committee is not clearly stated by Uganda Education Act of 
2008, it is reasonable to assume that some of its duties will include an oversight of draft financial 
plan prepared by the head teacher and his staff, exploring different expenditure options; 
monitoring budgeted income and expenditure; assessing the effectiveness of financial decisions 
and making recommendations to Board of Governors on financial matters. All these roles are 
expected to influence the financial performance of a school. Although there is no direct empirical 
evidence on the likely influence of finance committee in Ugandan secondary schools, existing 
research relating to finance or audit committee is largely mixed. For example in a survey of the 
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practitioner and academic literature on audit committee effectiveness, Spira (1999) concludes 
that these committees are largely ceremonial and largely ineffective in improving financial 
reporting. However, it has also been argued that in terms of accounting, an audit committee can 
improve the quality and accuracy of financial information (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991; 
McMullen, 1996), ensuring that the officers responsible for reporting and disclosure are more 
closely monitored and controlled. Similarly, we argue that the extent to which the finance sub-
committee fulfils its role should be positively associated with the performance of the school. We 
therefore hypothesize that: 
H2:  Finance committee role performance has a positive influence on the performance of 
 Ugandan secondary schools 
2.3 Board size  
 In the private sector, the link between board size and performance has been investigated 
by several researchers (e.g., Jerry, Kanak and Boeker, 1994; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004; 
Dalton and Dalton, 2005). The reasoning behind the relationship is that a larger board can bring 
more experience and knowledge from which the CEO may draw high-quality advice (Dalton et 
al., 1999). It has also been suggested that having a larger board can help to provide wider and 
important linkages for the company (Dalton et al., 1999; Mangena et al., 2012). Those who take 
the contrarian view, however, argue that larger boards are less effective in monitoring managers, 
since they are difficult to co-ordinate and it becomes very difficult to process problems due to the 
large number of people involved (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2007; Kajola, 2008). Also 
the costs of a larger board may outweigh the benefits, particularly in SMEs, where agency 
problems are minimal and there is no need for the extensive monitoring achieved by a larger 
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board. Given that the relationship between board size and performance can be either positive or 
negative, our hypothesis is non-directional. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H3: Board size has an influence on the performance of Ugandan secondary schools 
2.4 Frequency of board meetings 
Vafeas (1999) suggests that the link between frequency of board meetings and firm value is not a 
priori clear. This is because, there are costs associated with board meetings, including managerial 
time, travel expenses, and directors’ meeting fees. Vafeas (1999), however, suggests that there 
are also benefits, including more time for directors to confer, set strategy, and monitor 
management. If firms have fewer board meetings than are necessary, overemphasizing costs, 
board meeting frequency will be positively associated with firm value. Evidence in this direction 
would suggest that increasing meeting frequency is one fairly inexpensive way for firms to 
increase value. If, by contrast, benefits are overemphasized, board meeting frequency will be 
negatively related with firm value. Frequency of board meetings has been found to be associated 
with firm performance. For example, Evans and Weir (1995) suggest that regular meetings allow 
potential problems to be identified, discussed and avoided and should therefore lead to a superior 
level of performance and hence higher profitability. Their findings suggest that weekly meetings 
were associated with superior performance compared to monthly meetings. The influence of 
frequency of board meetings on firm performance was also investigated by Desai (1998) who 
found that increased number of board meetings was positively related to subsequent firm 
performance. Vafeas (1999) also found that operating performance of firms improved following 
years of abnormal board activity in terms of number of board meetings. The improvements were 
most pronounced for firms with poor prior performance. Although there is no prior literature 
specific to frequency of board meeting relating to secondary schools, we hypothesize that: 
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H4: Board frequency of meetings has a positive influence on the performance of Ugandan 
secondary schools 
 
2.5 Finance expertise of the board 
 The role of finance expertise on the boards has also been investigated previously. Prior 
studies, for example, found that capital markets react positively to the appointment of non-
executive directors with financial expertise to the audit committees (Defond et al., 2005), 
suggesting that finance expertise contributes to the effectiveness of the audit committee. Other 
studies reported a negative relationship between audit committees financial expertise and 
financial statements fraud (e.g., Abbott et al., 2000) and earnings management (Klein, 2002) and 
earnings restatement (Lin et al., 2006). This suggests that audit committee financial expertise 
may alleviate problems of financial fraud, earnings management and earnings restatement 
respectively. In addition, the findings of a positive relationship between audit committee 
financial expertise and extent of disclosure (e.g., Mangena and Pike, 2005) also suggest that 
audit committee financial expertise is effective in alleviating the problem of information 
asymmetry. A high proportion of finance experts on the governing board is expected to be 
positively associated with school performance because a higher proportion of finance experts is 
more likely to be associated with proper handling of finance. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H5: The proportion of finance experts on the Governing Board influences performance of 
Ugandan secondary schools 
 
2.6 Control variables 
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The work of Bartov et al (2000) suggest that failure to control for confounding variables 
could lead to falsely rejecting the hypothesis when in fact it should be accepted. A number of 
studies have found that firm size is associated with performance (e.g., Dalton et al., 1999; 
Mangena et al., 2012). In terms of governance, secondary schools in Uganda can be categorized 
into one of the three categories: government secondary schools, religious founded schools and 
independent schools operated purely for commercial reasons. It is of interest to establish any 
significant differences among these types of schools. According to McCormick et al (2006) the 
school’s respective state/government or religious bureaucracies ultimately govern schools in the 
first two categories, whatever the extent of systemic decentralization or devolution of decision-
making.  McCormick et al (2006) argued that  even if considerable power were devolved to a 
systemic school board, one could confidently predict bureaucratic intervention if the school 
board were perceived to be ineffective with negative consequences for the school or system. As a 
result, in this study we control for school size and whether the school is government owned or 
not. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Research setting 
 This study was done in Uganda, a land-locked country in East Africa. Uganda is bordered 
on the east by Kenya, on the north by South Sudan, on the west by the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, on the southwest by Rwanda and on the south by Tanzania. The southern part of the 
country includes a substantial portion of Lake Victoria, shared with Kenya and Tanzania. 
Uganda gained independence from Britain on 9 October 1962. This suggests that Ugandan 
education system draws much from the British system of Education. The educational 
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management however is currently traced to Ugandan Education (Pre-Primary, Primary and Post-
Primary) Act 2008 which requires a board of governors or a school management committee for 
any education institution.  
 The membership of such a board consists of: (a) five members including a chairperson, 
nominated by the foundation body at least one of whom must be a woman; (b) one local 
government representative nominated by the district council’s standing committee responsible 
for education; (c) one nominee of the local council; (d) two representatives of parents of the 
school elected at the annual general meeting one of whom must be the treasurer of the parents 
teachers’ association; (e) two representatives of the staff elected by the staff at one of their 
meetings; (f) one representative of old students elected at a meeting of the association of former 
students, if any, of the respective institutions’. Members of school boards serve a three-year term 
renewable once. The Act provides for committees of the board and the board appoints 
committees for the proper carrying out of its functions. One such committee is the finance 
committee. Membership of each committee cannot be less than four or more than six members 
including at least three board members, one staff member and one student.  
 In general, the functions of the board are those that are from time to time conferred by the 
Minister or district secretary for education. In addition, the Act also lists additional functions of 
the board as to: (a) govern the school; (b) administer the property of the school, whether movable 
or immovable; (c) administer any funds, chattels or things of the school derived by way of fund-
raising or auction, on behalf of the school; (d) provide for the welfare and discipline of students 
and staff, and fix fees and other charges with the approval of the Minister; and (e) perform such 
other functions as are prescribed by these Regulations. Board meetings are at least three times in 
a year at intervals not exceeding four months. The head teacher of a school which has a board is 
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secretary to the board and the deputy head teacher acts as assistant secretary. Any other member 
of staff such as school bursar may be invited by the chairperson to attend the board meeting. The 
following take the form of remuneration for board members: (a) reimburse any member or a 
member of any of its committees in respect of any expenses incurred by that member in 
attending to the business of the board; and (b) pay to any member or any member of any of its 
committees such allowances as may be approved. 
 Given that the Ugandan Education Act of 2008 is recent, this setting provided the ground 
for testing the hypotheses. 
 
3.2 Design and sample 
 The research design for this study is cross sectional. The study population is 3,645 
secondary schools in Uganda of which 841 secondary schools are in Kampala (303), Wakiso 
(383) and Mukono (155) districts (School Guide Uganda Ltd, 2012). Our survey of 271 
secondary schools is from these districts because these have traditionally dominated the 
education sector in Uganda.  For example, out of 18,286 students who scored division one in 
year 2012 ordinary level examinations, 8,695 were from those three districts. This means that 
while there are about 112 districts in Uganda, the three districts accounted for about 48 per cent 
of the students passing in division one in the whole country for ordinary level examinations – 
2012 (Ssenkabirwa, 2013; Businge, 2013). Secondary schools are the units of analysis. The 271 
schools were generated using Yamane’s (1973) sample selection approach. We selected the 271 
secondary schools proportionately as follows: Kampala – 98, Wakiso – 123 and Mukono – 50 
and collected the data through a survey questionnaire targeting school bursars or head teachers.  
The Likert-scale questionnaire was designed to measure the opinion or attitude of a respondent 
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(Burns and Grove, 2009) and utilized to obtain information from the school bursars or head 
teachers on their schools’ performance. As previous research supports the reliability and validity 
of the self-report measures (Brush and Vanderwerf, 1992; Lechner et al., 2006), we selected the 
respondents by virtue of their position and knowledge (McEvily and Marcus, 2005). Each 
questionnaire was accompanied by a cover letter providing explanations and assurances that all 
individual responses would be treated confidentially. A number of call backs to the respondents 
were made to ensure maximum retrieval of the questionnaires. A total of 200 usable responses 
were realised. 
3.3 Questionnaire and variables measurement 
 The dependent variable for this study is performance which is operationalised using 16 
Likert scale statements (rated on a 7-point scale with 1 - agree, 4 –Not sure, and 7–strongly 
agree). While Boyer and Lewis (2002) conducted their study on manufacturing firms using 
flexibility, quality and delivery of service, we apply the measures with modifications to the 
education sector, particularly secondary schools. The construct of quality comprises of the extent 
to which the school has provided high-performing students, offered consistent, reliable 
performance and, improved conformance to Uganda National examinations 
regulations/requirements. One such question which we asked to capture this is “student 
performance standards in grades 1 and 2 are satisfactory”. The construct of delivery comprises of 
the ability of the school to provide fast learners, meet syllabus completion deadlines and reduce 
on repetition rate/or dropout rates. For instance we asked a question like “student repetition rates 
are satisfactory”, to capture this dimension. Flexibility comprises of the ability of the school to 
make rapid changes in the design of syllabus, adjust capacity in form of facilities quickly, make 
rapid volume (in form of e.g. student numbers) changes, offer a large number of teaching service 
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features, offer a large degree of product variety (e.g. subjects on offer) and adjust product mix (in 
form of e.g. sciences and arts subjects). For instance we asked “the development and capacity 
building is satisfactory” to capture this dimension. The validated item scales can be found 
appended to this paper. 
 
 
3.4 Tests of factorability, validity and reliability 
 We use factor analysis based on (principal components) and Cronbach’s α to examine the 
validity and reliability of the scales as measures of board role performance, finance committee 
role performance and perceived school performance. To establish convergent validity, the 
principle components for each variable are extracted by running principle component analysis 
using varimax rotation method and factor loadings below .5 coefficients are suppressed to avoid 
extracting factors with weak loadings. Prior to performing the Principle Component Analysis for 
our scales we assess the suitability of the data for factor analysis based on sample size adequacy, 
the Kaise-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett tests. The results show the KMO values: board role 
performance = 0.592, finance committee role performance = 0.671 and performance of the 
school = 0.648. Bartlett’s test of sphericity in all scales reached statistical significance (p<0.05) 
(significant value was 0.00 for each scale). Collectively, these results support the factorability of 
the correlation matrices because our correlation matrices are significantly different from the 
identity matrices in which the variables would not correlate with each other. The determinants 
for all the three matrices were greater than 0.01 implying that there were no multicollinearity or 
singularity between variables. 
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 To determine the internal consistency (reliability) of our scales we computed Cronbach’s 
α coefficient for the study variables. The standardized α coefficients for all the scales, are found 
to be above 0.6 (board role performance α = .802, finance committee role performance α = .625 
and perceived performance of the school α = .702)  
3.5 Model 
 To examine the association between the secondary schools performance and governing 
boards (board role performance, finance committee role performance, board size, frequency of 
meetings and finance expertise) and the control variables (school ownership and size of the 
school) we specified the following multiple regression model: 
 
PERF  =  β0 + β1BRPM +β2FCRP+ β3BOSZ + β4FRME + β5FNEP+ β6OWNP +  
β7SIZE+εj   
 
[INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE] 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 The summary descriptive statistics for perceived Ugandan secondary schools 
performance, governing boards and control variables included in the analyses are presented in 
Table II. Results show that the mean for performance is 4.92 with a standard deviation of 0.66, 
that for board role performance is 5.45 with a standard deviation of 0.54 and that for the finance 
committee role performance is 5.50 with a standard deviation of 0.63.  As standard deviations 
relative to mean values are small, the calculated means highly represent the observed data (Field, 
2009; Saunders et al., 2007). The average board size is 13.66, slightly above the 12 members that 
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are stipulated by the Uganda Education Act 2008.  The minimum of 2, however, suggests that 
some schools do not comply with the requirements of the Education Act 2008.  
 
[INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE] 
The school boards meet on average, 5.77 times a year; above three times per year 
stipulated in the Education Act, 2008. On average, 44.84 per cent of the individuals have finance 
expertise.  About 13 per cent of the schools are owned by the government and the rest are either 
religiously (e.g. church) or privately owned. Finally, the size statistics suggest that 11 per cent of 
the schools have up to 560 pupils.  
 
4.2 Multiple regression results 
 
In Table III, we provide the Pearson product-moment correlation matrix among the 
variables. The correlations reveal that board role performance is positively associated with 
performance at 1% level or better. The correlation co-efficient between finance committee role 
performance and schools’ performance is -.38 which is also significant at the 1% level. Finance 
expertise is positively associated with performance at the 5% level and the relationship is 
significant at the 5% level.  Finally, the correlation analysis also show that school size and 
performance are negatively and significantly related at the 1% level. 
[INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE] 
The problem with univariate analyses is that they do not control for other factors, thus 
making the interpretation of results difficult. We, therefore, extend the analysis to a multivariate 
setting. We first examine correlations among our independent variables to determine whether 
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multicollinearity problems exist. Field (2005) suggests that multicollinearity becomes a problem 
only when correlations exceed 0.80 or 0.90. As Table III shows, none of the correlations between 
independent variables is close to these threshold values. However, according to Myers (1990), a 
certain degree of multicollinearity can still exist even when none of the correlation coefficients is 
very large. Therefore, we also examine the variance inflation factors (VIFs) in our models to 
further test for multicollinearity. The highest VIF was 1.51 in respect of frequency of board 
meetings. This is well below the threshold value of 10 suggested by Field (2005) indicating that 
multicollinearity does not pose a problem to the regressions. 
 In Table IV, we present the results of multiple regressions. The adjusted R² is 29% and 
the F-ratio is significant. The results show that board role performance, finance committee role 
performance, frequency of board meetings and finance expertise are significantly associated with 
performance at 5% level or better. Thus our hypotheses 1 (H1), 2 (H2), 4 (H4) and 5 (H5) are 
supported. The governing board size variable is, however, not significantly associated with 
performance, hence hypothesis 3 (H3) is not supported. In terms of our control variables, the 
results suggest that both ownership of the school and size are not significantly associated with 
performance at the 5% level. However, size is negatively associated with performance at the 
10% level. 
 
[INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE] 
4.3 Discussion 
Results show that the relationship between board role performance and the schools’ 
performance is the most significant in terms of the t-ratio of 3.99. This significant positive 
relationship between board role performance and school’s performance suggest that the more 
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boards fulfil their roles such as resource provision, service, monitoring and control, the better the 
performance of the school. Finance committee role performance is also positively and 
significantly associated with performance confirming the notion that finance committee role 
performance is important for the overall performance of schools. The negative but significant 
regression between frequency of board meetings and performance is interesting given that it 
suggests that boards which meet more frequently lead to worse performance. The positive and 
significant relationship between finance expertise and performance is consistent with the 
suggestion that individuals with finance expertise can offer advice to the organisation to improve 
organisational outcomes.  
 In terms of control variables, the results suggest that school size affects its performance 
in many ways. Firstly, as large secondary schools are associated with large-sized boards, this 
school structure sets the path in terms of its choice of competitive arena as well as the overall 
strategy for achieving its mission and purpose. The large sized boards (average is 13.66) could 
be the cause of the negative though insignificant relationship with performance. This observation 
concurs with the observation more than 20 years ago made by Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and 
Jensen (1993) that when firm boards expand beyond seven or eight people, they are less likely to 
function effectively. Secondly, while frequency of meetings is a significant predictor of 
performance, its coefficient is also negative. We can then conservatively deduce that when large-
sized boards meet frequently, this will negatively affect performance of secondary schools – 
secondary schools do not need a large board to improve performance. Such an observation 
confirms the finding of Vafeas (1999) that the annual number of board meetings is inversely 
related to firm value. We believe this result in the context of our study, is driven by the large 
number of board members who if they increase their activity (measured by frequency of 
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meetings) becomes a negative element in schools’ performance by way of increasing sitting 
allowances and other attendant costs to the secondary schools. Overall, while the result suggests 
that a combination of meeting frequency and board size may be an important dimension in 
explaining performance of a secondary school, it is board effectiveness (in terms of its role 
performance) that has been clearly highlighted as a crucial element for performance of secondary 
schools. It is not size or meeting frequency per se that has to be important.  
Thus our results suggest that school boards should have the requisite knowledge of the 
operation and management of the school and its external environment, make and influence 
decisions and, commit to the task of governing. For example, the commitment to the task of 
governing requires boards’ commitment to a shared sense of mission and clear goals, academic 
focus and high expectations and performance monitoring. Such key ingredients have been 
identified (see, Wildy, 1991; Reynolds et al., 1996) as common characteristics of effective 
schools. Besides, expertise (like in finance) is important for the organisational performance, 
(Jackson et al., 2003; Robinson & Ward, 2005) and our results suggest that these are largely 
determined by the characteristics of individual governing board members (Jackson et al., 2003). 
Therefore our finding adds to the evidence that board role performance contributes to strategic 
direction and organisational performance (Kroll et al., 1997).  It also suggests that finance 
committee role performance and finance expertise of the board are important drivers of schools’ 
performance. Thus the institutional role of a school board is considerably significant for the 
performance of a secondary school. 
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
 
 The objective of this research was to investigate the effect of governing boards governing 
boards on the performance of Ugandan secondary schools. The objective was achieved through a 
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questionnaire survey of 271 secondary schools throughout Uganda of which 200 responded with 
usable responses. Performance was measured using sixteen statements on a 7 point Likert scale. 
The results indicate that board role performance, finance committee role performance, frequency 
of board meetings and finance expertise are significantly associated with performance.  
 Overall, these results have important implication for academics as well as stakeholders 
such as the government of Uganda. For academics, our results suggest that board and finance 
committee role performance are more important for performance of an organisation than board 
size, frequency of meetings and finance expertise which academics have been focusing on. For 
the Ugandan government, the results are important for governing board policy development; for 
example, in terms of prescribing the qualifications for governing board members and also 
finance committee board members. Besides, the size of the school’s board should not be 
determined exogenously as the Act of 2008 suggests rather, it should be endogenously 
determined to fit the needs of a school. The Act appears to be prescribing too large a board for 
some schools and when this is coupled with more frequent meetings, it becomes a negative 
element in performance of the secondary school. 
Like any study, there are a number of limitations with the present study. Thus the 
contributions should be interpreted in the light of the following limitations. First, the present 
study was limited to the secondary schools in Kampala, Wakiso and Mukono districts of Uganda 
and it is possible that the results are only applicable to those districts in Uganda. Secondly, 
whereas head teachers and bursars were asked as respondents and not the board governors 
themselves and we believe they could provide some more objective assessment of board 
performance because they are always present at board meetings, the influence of common 
methods bias can still remain a burgeoning concern.  Finally, we measure our variables 
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qualitatively and perceptively contrary to, for instance, the commonly used quantitative measures 
of performance, but process factors which are inherently qualitative in nature can better explain 
variances in secondary schools’ performance.  Thus, in this study, we do not claim highly refined 
measurement concepts. More research is therefore needed to better refine qualitative concepts 
used in this study. Because of the likelihood that common methods bias/or variance may have 
cropped into our study, we suggest further research that uses independent data for school 
performance. As this research suggests that board and finance committee role performance are 
more important than board size, frequency of meetings and finance expertise, more research is 
needed to validate the posited relationships. In spite of the limitations cited above, policy makers 
of Uganda dealing with the education sector, academicians, secondary school governing boards, 
secondary school owners and even general readers interested in the field of education might find 
this study useful. Also, as frequency of board meetings is not significantly associated with 
performance of a secondary school and yet is a significant predictor of secondary schools’ 
performance, future research may wish to examine whether it is a mediator in the relationship 
between governing boards effectiveness and performance of secondary schools.  
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Table I: Definition of variables included in the regression model 
  Variable(s) Definition 
Dependent variable 
PERF Performance Perceived performance of the school on a 7- point Likert 
scale 
Independent variables 
BRPM Board role performance Perceived board role performance on a 7-point Likert 
scale 
FCRP Finance Committee role 
performance 
Perceived role performance on a 7 point Likert scale 
BOSZ  Board size Number of individuals on the school board 
FRME Meeting frequency The number of times the school board of governors 
meets per calendar year 
FNEP Finance expertise Number of individuals on the governing board with 
finance background scaled by the total number on 
individuals on the governing board 
OWNP Ownership of the School Dichotomous variables, 1 if the school is owned by the 
government; ‘0’ otherwise 
SIZE Size of the School Dichotomous variables, 1 if the school has over up to 
560 pupils enrolled; ‘0’ otherwise 
GEBA  Gender balance of the school The number of female governors divided by the total 
number of people on the school board of governors 
εj Error term  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Performance 200  4.92 .66 3.00 6.88 
Board role performance 200  5.45 .54 3.06 6.81 
Finance Committee role performance 200  5.50 .63 2.67 6.75 
Board size 200 13.66 4.26 2.00 23.00 
Meeting frequency 200 5.77 2.49 0.00 10.00 
Finance expertise 200 .45 .20 0.00 1.00 
Ownership of the school 200 .14 .34 0.00 1.00 
Size 200 .11 .31 0.00 1.00 
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Table III:  
Pearson Correlations Between the Dependent and Independent Variables (N=200) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Performance 1.00        
Board role performance .44** 1.00       
Finance Committee role 
performance 
.38** .46** 1.00      
Board size -.06 .04 .15* 1.00     
Meeting frequency -.12 -.17* .00 .36** 1.00    
Finance expertise .24** .08 .13 -.05 .36** 1.00   
Ownership of the school .03 .03 -.03 .14* -.03 -.21** 1.00  
Size -.20** -.14* -.17* -.22* -.26** -.24** .00 1.00 
** Correlations significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *Correlations significant at the 0.05 level (2 –tailed). 
 
 
Table IV: Multiple Regression Results 
Number of obs = 200; F =12.40; Prob> 0.00; R2 = 0.31; Adj R2 .29; MSE = .71; Durbin Watson = 
1.87. 
Source  SS  df  MS  
Model  26.74  7  3.82  
Residual  59.14  192  .31  
Total  85.87  199    
PERF Coef. Std err t-value Sig 95% Con. Interval  VIF 
     Lower Bound Upper 
Bound 
 
(Constant) 1.90 .49 3.88 .00 .93 2.85  
Board role 
performance 
.34 .09 3.99 .00 .17 .51       1.33 
Finance 
Committee 
role 
performance 
.22 .07 3.11 .00 .08 .36       1.32 
Board size -.01 .01 -.94 .35 -.03 .01      1.30 
Meeting 
frequency 
-.05 .02 -2.30 .02 -.08 -.01 1.51 
Finance 
expertise 
.79 .23 3.45 .00 .34 1.25 1.33 
Ownership of 
the school 
        .16         .12 1.33         
.19 
       -.08         .39        1.07 
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Size        -.26        .14      -1.91       
.06 
       -.53         .01        1.17 
Mean VIF       1.29 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix  
 
Name of the School__________________________________________________(optional) 
 
Back ground information, (please tick as appropriate) 
 
a) Highest Qualification of respondent or equivalent qualification 
High school Diploma 1st Degree Masters Professional PhD 
      
 
b) In which District is this School? 
Kampala Wakiso Mukono 
   
 
c) In what range does your total enrolled students lie 
1- 280 students 281-560 students 561- 840 students 841 - 1,120 students Above 1120 students 
     
 
d) This School is 
Purely government owned and founded  Religiously founded Purely privately owned 
   
 
e) Please, state your position in this School. _____________________________________ 
 
f) Please state the number of members on your board of governors____________________ 
 
g) Of the number stated in f) above, how many have a finance and accounts background_______ 
 
h) About how many times does your board meet in a year? 
 
Nev
er 
Onc
e 
Tw
ice 
thr
ice 
4 
times 
5 
times 
6 
times 
7 
times 
8 
times 
9 
times 
10 
times 
11 
times 
12 
times 
Above 
12 times 
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i) The table below describes, for your school, the finance committee role performance. Please 
evaluate the statements by ticking in box with the number that best suits this committee in your 
School 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Not sure Somewhat 
agree 
agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The finance committee of this school: 
1 Causes the preparation of final accounts in respect of the preceding year 
within 3 months after the commencement of each financial year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 Ensures the Auditor General or his representatives audit the accounts of this 
school 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 Uses the requisite accounting knowledge 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 Uses the requisite financial knowledge 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 Uses its appropriate training for the proper execution of its functions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 Has a keen interest in all financial matters of the school 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 Has a keen interest in all audit matters of the school 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
j) The table below describes, for your school, the effectiveness of the governing board 
(performance of its roles). Please evaluate the statements by ticking in box with the number that 
best suits this School 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Not sure Somewhat 
agree 
agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The governing board of this school: 
1 Pursues the interests of the owners of this school 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 Pursues the interests of the members of this school 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 Selects the head teacher 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 Supports the head teacher 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 Evaluates the head teacher’s performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 Provides feedback to the head teacher on his/her weaknesses and strength 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 Ensures programmes offered by the school are congruent with its mission 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 Ensures careful management of the school’s resources 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 Presents a positive image of the school 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 Seeks to optimise its own performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 Focuses on students’ achievement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 Focuses on effective management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 Focuses on developing conducive structures for head teacher’s performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 Enhances collaborative relationship with the head teacher 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 Enhances beneficial communication with other stakeholders like government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16 Ensures effective performance in policy making 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17 Ensures effective performance in financial management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18 Makes and influences decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19 Commits to the task of governing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20 Devotes time to effective decision-making 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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k) The table below describes, for your school, its performance. Please evaluate the statements by 
ticking in box with the number that best suits this School 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Not sure Somewhat 
agree 
agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In this school: 
1 We balance gender and urban/rural enrolment  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 There is adequate representation of students from the poorest families 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 Student progression rates are satisfactory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 Student repetition rates are acceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 Net intake of age 13 or 14 in senior 1 is appropriate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 Students’ skills training and higher education enrolment patterns are 
satisfactory 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 The pre-service teacher training enrolment is satisfactory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 Student performance standards in grades 1 and 2 is satisfactory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 Availability of instructional materials and trained teachers is satisfactory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 The student–teacher ratio is satisfactory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 Coverage of science, technology and ICT facilities is satisfactory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 The development and capacity building is satisfactory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 Priority programmes, spending patterns and disbursement are appropriate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 Internal audit system is satisfactory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 Salary and non-salary allocations and other expenditure ratios are adequate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16 Teaching and non-teaching staff numbers are adequate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We thank you. 
 
 
